Kant considers that the ground of duty, the moral law has its source a priori in our rational natures and is not based on our empirical knowledge of human beings. I claim that he is also pointing to certain features that are necessary to presuppose about human beings for the moral law to be applicable. Respect is one of these features that both allows for the recognition of any duty and provides an explanation of how the moral law can motivate in the human case. 'Respect' is also used in a narrower sense to reflect presuppositions of certain specific duties.
position that it is the moral law alone that motivates, without his account of respect we would not have an explanation at the phenomenal level of how it could motivate in the human case. Second, the account of respect indicates what must be presupposed about human beings in order that they are able to be aware of any duties that have their origin in our rational natures. It is also what has to be presupposed for the recognition of specific duties that Kant attributes to respect as opposed to love. These are the duties that are owed to others and Kant claims that it is necessary to presuppose the feeling of respect in the human case to be aware of these duties.
The second thesis of the paper, that is an implication of the first thesis, is the claim that there is not a single account of respect, Achtung, in Kant's writings. Rather there is a broad account of respect that covers any duties and a narrower meaning when a specific range of duties are being considered. In each case there is a corresponding account of what features must be presupposed in our phenomenal natures in order for respect to perform the function allocated to it. I propose to call the first 'respect (B)' and the second 'respect (N)'.
Respect
There are four different contexts in which Kant discusses respect (Achtung).
1. Respect "as a subjective motive of activity, as a drive to obey the law and as the ground of maxims of a course of life conformable to the law." 7 This feature is also discussed in the Groundwork and I shall claim that in this context he intends respect (B).
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Kant and Respect 2. Respect is isolated as being one of the necessary feelings that is presupposed for a human being to recognise something as a duty. 8 In this context, Kant uses the Latin equivalent reverentia, reverence, respect, fear or awe. I shall argue that this feeling is respect (N) and is what is presupposed for the specific duties flowing from respect. Moral feeling is also isolated in this section of the
Metaphysics of Morals as being a necessary presupposition for the recognition
of any duty in man and I shall claim that this is synonymous with respect (B).
3. Within the duties of virtue to others, there are those arising from love and those arising from respect. Of the latter Kant writes respect "is therefore recognition of a dignity (dignitas) in other human beings, that is, of a worth that has no price, no equivalent for which the object evaluated (aestimii) could be exchanged." 9 In this context, Kant uses the Latin equivalent observantia aliis praestanda, the respect due to others. Here he is discussing, I shall claim, respect (N).
4. Within the duties arising from love, respect also figures in the discussion of gratitude. Kant writes, "Gratitude consists in honouring a person because of a benefit he has rendered us. The feeling connected with this judgment is respect for the benefactor (who puts one under obligation), whereas the benefactor is viewed as only in a relation of love toward the recipient." 10 This is also respect (N).
I shall argue that the use described in (1) above is where Kant is describing the phenomenal mechanism that accompanies the motive of duty. In this case it reflects the motive of duty but its occurrence is because we are considering duty in combination with beings who have phenomenal natures. This point is further made in point (4) above where respect is accorded to a benefactor in recognition of their performance of a duty that is required by rational natures, namely, the duty to seek other people's happiness. This though is unlike the duties described in (3) above since gratitude is a positive duty that is owed to a benefactor.
Both the duties described in (3) and (4) result from applying the moral law to the human case. Since we are finite beings who are dependent on each other for assistance, the moral law prescribes duties of non-interference and assistance. A drive is defined by Kant as "a subjective determining ground of a will whose reason does not by its nature necessarily conform to the objective law." 16 Thus, drives are only possessed by humans and not by divine wills since they are attributes of beings in whom the moral law does not automatically determine the will. By describing these as "subjective", I take Kant to be making the point that they are objects of experience and belong therefore to the phenomenal world. Drives are possessed by beings who have, in the language of the Groundwork 17 , selves that can be viewed both phenomenally and intelligibly.
What then is the "drive" of the moral law or, the question that Kant takes as
synonymous, "what happens to the human faculty of desire as a consequence of this motive"? 18 Kant's reply is that respect for the moral law is the moral drive 19 and his account of respect is thus designed to explain how the moral law can become the drive. The account of respect then provides an explanation of how the moral law can be a motive. Kant writes, "Thus the moral law… is also a subjective motive. That is, it is the drive to this action, since it has an influence on the sensuousness of the subject and effects a feeling which promotes the influence of the law on the will." 20 The last part of this quotation requires elaboration. What does it mean to say that this feeling "promotes the influence of the law on the will"? In order to understand this we Respect is:
(1) a feeling because in thwarting all inclination that might be contrary to morality it is thwarting feelings. This is because all inclinations, according to Kant, are based on feelings and a negative effect on feeling is itself a feeling.
This feeling:
(a) "…is a feeling produced by an intellectual cause" 26 (b) "…is the only feeling that we can know completely a priori" 27 ( c) consists of:
(i) a feeling of pain which arises when our inclinations are thwarted. This is described by Kant as the negative effect on feeling. He also describes this as humiliation (intellectual contempt).
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(ii) A positive feeling is generated by the removal of the resistance of our inclinations. Kant writes, "respect for the law is thus by virtue of its intellectual cause a positive feeling that can be known a priori , for any diminution of obstacles to an activity furthers this activity itself." displeasure, taking an interest in the action or its effect." 33 Both these elements are in the feeling of respect that Kant describes. However, it must be remembered that, as described above, the practical choice is an act of will whereby we act on maxims.
Kant states this point succinctly in Religion Within the Boundaries of Mere Reason
where he writes, …that freedom of the power of choice has the characteristic, entirely peculiar to it, that it cannot be determined to action through any incentive except so far as the human being has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it into a universal rule for himself, according to which he wills to conduct himself); only in this way can an incentive, whatever it may be, coexist with the absolute spontaneity of the power of choice (of freedom). 34 Therefore, all choice is represented as a practical activity whether the maxims are based on interests that have moral worth or not. 35 The contrast to be drawn then is not between the passivity of certain interests that are based on sensations and the activity involved in moral interests since to act on either involves a practical activity of reason. The contrast is rather to be explained in the causal account that Kant gives of the origination of the feeling of respect in contrast to the origination of other feelings.
In point 1(a) above he describes the cause of the feeling of respect as being an intellectual one. As such it is not a possible object of experience.
This feeling of respect is produced by an intellectual cause and is the only feeling that we can know a priori. Now because it is produced by an intellectual cause, we cannot be aware of this cause as an item of experience. In this way we have a contrast between moral feeling and pathological feeling because the cause of these latter feelings lies in emotions and passions that are the objects of experience. In the case of the first point 36 Respect, in contrast to the enjoyment or gratification of happiness, is something for which there can be no feeling basic and prior to reason, for such a feeling would always be sensuous and pathological. Respect as the consciousness of the direct constraint of the will through law is hardly analogous to the feeling of pleasure, although in relation to the faculty of desire it produces exactly the same effect, but from different sources. 37 Pathological interests are in the object of an action that is based on our inclination.
Reason here is just needed to supply the rule for achieving the object for which we have an inclination. In the case of practical interests, it is the action that interests us and not the object. determined is viewed as arising from free choice. In the case of 1 a) this Willkür is exercised as Wille and in the latter case the choice is exercised to achieve some object.
Neither 1 a) nor 1 b) is an object of experience. However, this does not debar us in the case of 1 b) talking of the causal chain between objects that we desire and our feelings
and this is what is described in 2 b). The same can also be ascribed to 2 a) with the only difference that here respect has an intellectual cause and is not something causally related to pre-existing sensations that we might contingently have.
Understood in this way, Kant is therefore giving an account, in this section of the Critique of Practical Reason, of the phenomenal mechanism that accompanies the motive of duty. As Kant reminds us frequently, this motive of duty is not an object of experience. He writes in the Groundwork that "there cannot be cited a single certain example of the disposition to act from duty." 38 Kant is providing an account of the motive for adherence to the moral law when this is interpreted as demanding an account from the phenomenal point of view. This point is made explicitly by Kant both in the Groundwork and the Critique of Practical
Reason. In the Groundwork he writes, " Now an action done from duty must altogether exclude the influence of inclination and therewith every object of the will.
Hence there is nothing left which can determine the will except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law…" 39 More needs to be said though about how exactly respect is the explanation, at the phenomenal level, of how the moral law should directly determine the will. I have already claimed that respect has both an affective element and a cognitive element and that the element of feeling should not be viewed as un-Kantian in anyway since moral feeling is to be distinguished from pathological feeling. Andrews Reath also claims that respect has both an intellectual and affective aspect and argues that "it is the intellectual aspect which is active in motivating moral conduct, while the affective side, or feeling of respect, is its effect on certain sensible tendencies… " I am not claiming that Kant considers that respect is "the original motive for adherence to the law". The original motive is obedience to the law but the phenomenal counterpart of that is respect. Although, Kant describes respect as an effect of the moral law, this does not preclude it acting as a motive. 46 Essentially, the prime source of confusion in the discussion here is an ambiguity in the word 'effect'.
However, my account is to claim that 'respect' is the label at the phenomenal level for the way in which we are conscious of the moral law. In this sense it can be both an effect and an incentive as is made clear by Kant when he writes, "…respect for the Moral Law must be regarded also as a positive but indirect effect of the law on feeling…we must see it as a subjective ground of activity. As an incentive for obedience to the law." 47 Here then it is respect as a feeling that Kant is discussing and he is recognising that it can be both an effect and an incentive. Law …The affective aspect is … an effect that occurs after, or in conjunction with, the determination of the will by the Moral Law." 49 Respect as a subjective condition that is necessary for receptiveness to duty arising from what is owed to others.
Kant lists four " subjective conditions of receptiveness to the concept of duty" which he describes as "antecedent predisposition on the side of feeling." 50 These are moral feeling, conscience, love of man and respect. Kant's point is that it makes no sense to talk of a duty to acquire these predispositions since it is necessary for human beings to have them, at least to some degree, to recognise any duties. These predispositions ought to be cultivated but it makes no sense to say that we ought to have them or that we have a duty to have them since without them we would not have the necessary attributes to recognise any duties whatsoever. Kant writes, "…it is by virtue of them that he can be put under obligation." 51 They are what make us describable as moral beings since without these to some degree we "would be morally dead;
and…humanity would dissolve…into mere animality and be mixed irretrievably with the mass of other natural beings." 52 They are necessary conditions for the awareness of duty in man although they are not the ground of these duties and consciousness of them "can…only follow from consciousness of a moral law, as the effect this has on our mind." 53 Moral Feeling "is the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent with or contrary to the law of duty." 54 what is a required attribute of human beings for them to be susceptible to the subjective motive of respect described in the Critique of Practical Reason. It is evident that we are able to have the feeling described earlier as respect (B) because we have part of the propensity that is necessary for this feeling, namely, the susceptibility to feel pleasure or pain. Since the receptiveness described when activated corresponds to the feeling of respect (B) when utilised to explain the moral drive, I think that it is a reasonable interpretation to assume that this can be described as the predisposition that corresponds to respect (B). Indeed, Kant equates respect and moral feeling at several points. For example, "This feeling (respect), under the name of moral feeling, is therefore produced solely by reason." (My parenthesis) 55 Conscience "is practical reason holding the human being's duty before him for his acquittal or condemnation in every case that comes under a law." The last two subjective conditions that Kant describes are actually feelings. Love of man is again a feeling that needs to be presupposed in some degree for the recognition of duties. By love Kant is not here talking of the duty we have to practical love or benevolence. "Love is a matter of feeling…a duty to love is an absurdity. But benevolence (amor benevolentiae), as conduct, can be subject to a law of duty." 59 However, some susceptibility to "the love that is delight (amor complacentiae) is direct. But to have a duty to this…is a contradiction." 60 Kant seems to be linking the presupposition of this feeling specifically with the recognition of duties to others that arise from love since he also mentions that, as an empirical claim, "Beneficence is a duty. If someone practices it often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped." 61 However, Kant's point seems to be that there must be some love of our fellow human beings in order to be receptive to the specific duties arising from love. As he points out, this love might increase if someone practices the duty of beneficence but if human beings were totally lacking in any of this feeling for their fellow man then the duties arising from beneficence would leave human beings untouched. Unlike moral feeling and conscience which are general requirements for the motive of respect described in the Critique of Practical Reason, love of man is a susceptibility that must be presupposed for the recognition of a certain specific set of duties: those that arise from love.
Kant and Respect
Respect (reverentia) is also a subjective feeling like love and is the feeling of selfesteem. Again, Kant is not suggesting that there can be a duty of self-esteem but "he must have respect for the law within himself in order even to think of any duty whatsoever." 62 It might appear that Kant is linking this feeling with the susceptibility to recognise specifically duties to the self rather than to others by talking of this feeling of respect as being one of self-esteem. However, when he comes to the discussion of duties arising from respect (point 3 at the beginning of the paper), he explains that there are duties to others arising from respect. "The respect that I have for others or that another can require from me (observantia aliis praestanda) is therefore recognition of a dignity (dignitas) in other human beings." 63 As can be seen, Kant uses different Latin equivalences for 'respect' in the case when he is referring to a feeling and when he is referring to the maxim of the respect due to others. It is therefore the feeling that is presupposed in human beings when he is discussing the specific duties arising from respect and hence corresponds to respect (N).
In summary, Kant is claiming that there are four conditions that are presupposed as being present in phenomenal natures that are necessary for the recognition of duties.
The first two are more general than the latter two covering presupposed conditions common to all duties and the latter two reflect the feelings presupposed for the recognition of duties specifically attributable to firstly love and secondly respect.
Clearly, Kant is not arguing that the source of duties lies in these predispositions.
Kant holds consistently to the view that the source of duty lies in the moral law. Duty as the idea of the universality of laws is thus the source of duty. In discussing these four necessary presuppositions present in our phenomenal natures for the recognition of duties, Kant is not claiming that they provide either the ground of the validity of our duties or the motivational source for the performance of duties. However, they are necessary for the recognition of duties. They are a priori conditions that need to be presupposed for moral philosophy, being properly used to refer just to the rational part, to be able to gain applicability to man.
In highlighting the need for human beings to have the two feelings of respect and love in order to be able to be receptive to specific duties is one way in which Kant's moral philosophy, although derived from rationality, requires for its application that human beings have these feelings. Although not the source of our duties, feelings have a necessary role to play since without them we would not be the sort of creatures that could recognise duties. In this sense morality requires the presence of these feelings on the affective side of our natures.
We also, as Kant makes clear in his discussion of these four subjective conditions, have a duty to cultivate them. He mentions the duty to "cultivate one's conscience" 64 and that the obligation "with regard to moral feeling can be only to cultivate it." 65 He also remarks that if someone practises the duty of beneficence "often and succeeds in realizing his beneficent intention, he eventually comes actually to love the person he has helped." 66 This increase in the feeling of love is likely to make us aware of more occasions when we could help others and thus indirectly contributes to the duty of beneficence.
Duties that we owe to others arising from respect (N)
Kant divides the duties of virtue into those: The specific duties arising from respect (N) then apply to all persons, or, as I indicated at the start of the paper, the moral law. It is not dependent on any particular position that someone might have in society or any particular relationships. These duties are present whatever the character of the individual and whatever that individual has done. Kant writes, Nonetheless I cannot deny all respect to even a vicious man as a human being;
I cannot withdraw at least the respect that belongs to him in his quality as a human being, even though by his deeds he makes himself unworthy of it. So there can be disgraced punishments that dishonor humanity itself (such as quartering a man, having him torn by dogs, cutting off his nose and ears). 71 The duties of respect that are owed in virtue of man as a rational being and exemplar of the moral law are universal and cannot be denied whatever the individual has done.
This bedrock of respect is owed to all men in virtue of their possession of humanity and is distinguished by Kant from respect that might be dependent on contingent differences between individuals and is therefore not attributable to their humanity per se.
The different forms of respect to be shown to others in accordance with difference in their qualities or contingent relations -differences of age, sex, birth, strength or weakness, or even rank and dignity,…cannot be set forth in detail and classified in the metaphysical first principles of a doctrine of virtue, since this has to do only with its pure rational principles. 72 The duties of respect then are applicable to all persons in virtue of their possession of rationality irrespective of any contingent details about them, including any wrongdoing that they might have done.
Respect (N) and Gratitude
As I pointed out above, the duties arising from love are not owed but do put others under an obligation to you. Kant is not talking about a feeling here but the maxim of benevolence and so if one is beneficent to someone else then that person is under an obligation to you or has a duty of gratitude to you.
Gratitude consists in honouring a person because of a benefit he has rendered us. The feeling connected with this judgment is respect for the benefactor (who puts one under obligation), whereas the benefactor is viewed as only in a relation of love toward the recipient. 73 This is a duty and not just, for example, prudential advice about how to obtain further assistance. This is unlike the duties discussed in connection with respect above in two main respects. They were negative duties but here the duty of gratitude requires the positive duty that we honour our benefactor. The second difference is that this duty is not something that is owed to all men as such. It is only owed to the particular 27 Kant and Respect benefactor and the degree of gratitude can vary depending on "how useful the favour was to the one put under obligation and how unselfishly it was bestowed on him." 74 
Conclusion
If we accept the Kantian account that the ground of morality lies in reason alone then, if my argument is correct, this has implications for what must be assumed about rational finite beings if they are to both be aware of their duties and also to show how such beings can be motivated solely by the moral law. It is Kant's analysis of 'respect' that provides this account and thus provides a bridge between moral philosophy, understood as referring to the rational part of ethics and anthropology.
Although Kant does not deviate from the view that the ground of morality lies in the moral law, for the moral law to have application to human beings it is necessary to presuppose certain features about our natures, without which we would be morally dead and the moral law would have no application to us and would not be able to motivate us. I have shown that respect plays a pivotal role in this account.
Notes

